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NOTES 
Aggravated Assaults with Chairs versus Guns: 




In a bar called Andrea's Attic, David and Victor were having a 
drink when they got into an argument. The argument escalated until 
Victor said something that infuriated David. David looked at Victor, 
and, wanting to hurt Victor, grabbed the nearest object, a chair, and 
then threw it at Victor. The chair hit Victor and he fell to the ground, 
but was not hurt.1 
In a bar called Barb's Barn down the street, Valerie was having a 
drink. Dorothy walked into the bar, grabbed Valerie by the arm and 
dragged her outside onto the street. As Valerie was dragged, she saw 
that Dorothy gripped a gun in her hand. On the street, Dorothy 
pointed the gun at Valerie and yelled, "You are going to die." Then 
Dorothy waved the gun in the air, threatening to fire it at the bar, at 
the sky, at Valerie, but never fired. Then, after holding Valerie at gun­
point for five minutes, Dorothy hit Valerie on the back of the head, 
pistol whipping her, so that she fell to the ground. Valerie was not in­
jured. 
Currently, in most federal circuits, despite the fact that Dorothy 
threatened Valerie with a brandished gun that she carried into the bar 
with her while David picked up the nearest chair and threw it without 
brandishing or threatening, David and Dorothy will receive the same 
sentence for their crimes. Courts hold that each committed an aggra­
vated assault while "otherwise using"2 a dangerous weapon under the 
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines" or 
"USSG"), but because neither committed another felony during the 
1. The example of an aggravated assault with a chair is based on the facts of United 
States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992), in which the defendant struck a fellow in­
mate at a reformatory with a metal chair. 
2. The term "otherwise used" means "conduct [that] did not amount to the discharge of 
a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dan­
gerous weapon." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n.l(g) (1998) 
[hereinafter "USSG"]. This Note discusses in detail the meaning and application of the term. 
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assault, and neither victim was seriously injured, courts will treat each 
the same under the Guidelines.3 
Courts should sentence David and Dorothy differently because 
David did not "otherwise use" the chair to commit the aggravated as­
sault, and, in fact, it was only his "use" of the chair that qualified him 
for aggravated assault as opposed to simple assault.4 On the other 
hand, Dorothy qualified for the aggravated assault Guideline because 
she possessed a gun, and then, when she pistol whipped Valerie, she 
"otherwise used" the gun.5 This Note addresses the sentencing issues 
presented by these contrasting examples and argues that courts should 
sentence defendants like David, who used a chair, more leniently than 
defendants like Dorothy, who used a gun. 
In the 1980s Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
("Act")6 to improve the federal system for sentencing federal defen­
dants. Through the Act, Congress created the United States Sentenc­
ing Commission ("Commission"). 7 The Act directed the Commission 
to establish specific guidelines for federal sentencing.8 The Commis­
sion thereby drafted the Guidelines to eliminate unwarranted sen­
tencing disparities between similarly situated defendants. The Com­
mission's articulated goals were to produce uniformity and 
proportionality in sentencing.9 As of November 1, 1987,10 the 
3. The relevant portions of the USSG provisions discussed in this Note are reproduced 
as follows: 
§ 2A2.2. Aggravated Assault 
a) Base Offense Level: 15 
b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
(2)(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels; (B) if a dangerous weapon (in­
cluding a firearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a dangerous weapon 
(including a firearm) was brandished or its use was threatened, increase by 3 levels. 
USSG § 2A2.2. Application Note 1 defines "aggravated assault" as "a felonious assault that 
involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten), 
or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony." USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. 
n.l. 
4. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2. 
5. See infra Sections l.B.1 and I.B.2. 
6. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-
66, 3571-74, 3581-86; 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-98 (1994)). 
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a). 
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 (a), (b)(l). 
9. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also Tung Yin, Comment, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using 
Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement In Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 
83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 429 (1995). 
10. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 
40 EMORY L.J. 393, 394 (1991). 
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Guidelines bound federal courts to follow them when sentencing per­
sons convicted of federal crimes.11 
Courts determine a sentence under the Guidelines by applying fac­
tors on a matrix. Each factor corresponds to a number called a "level," 
and courts add or subtract levels according to the facts of the case and 
the defendant's criminal history. A sentencing court calculates a sen­
tence by finding the intersection on the matrix of the "base offense 
level"12 of the conviction and the defendant's "criminal history cate­
gory. "13 Once the court identifies this intersection it fine tunes the sen­
tence by applying any applicable "specific offense characteristics,"14 
each with a different level.15 The court can then further fine tune the 
result by applying upward or downward adjustments.16 In the end, the 
court arrives at a level that corresponds to a certain number of months 
in prison. 
For example, consider the aggravated assault Guideline for a de­
fendant with no criminal history.1 7 The base offense level for aggra­
vated assault18 is a level 15.19 A court may add levels for applicable 
specific offense characteristics. For example: If a firearm was dis-
11. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2). For a helpful description of how a judge calculates a fed­
eral sentence under the Guidelines, see Daniel I. Smulow, Comment, When Fair Is Foul: 
Federal Drug Sentencing in the Wake ofUnited States v. LaBonte, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
437, 437 n.3 (1998). 
12. "Base offense level" is the conduct accounted for in the elements of a charged of­
fense of which a defendant is convicted, or to which he pied guilty. The Guidelines do not 
track the purely statutory language of the elements in the base offense levels, rather they are 
descriptions of generic conduct. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a). A court locates the appropriate 
"base offense levels" in Chapter 2 of the Guidelines. See Erich D. Andersen, Enhancement 
for "Abuse of a Position of Trust" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 70 OR. L. REV. 
181, 186 n.23 (1991). 
13. The defendant's "criminal history" is based on factors relating to the defendant's 
prior sentences. A defendant will receive a longer sentence depending on the number and 
types of prior sentences he has served. See USSG § 4Al.l. 
· 
14. "Specific offense characteristics" are those characteristics specific to the defendant's 
conduct or harm that Congress has determined to be aggravating or mitigating factors of a 
crime. An example of a specific offense characteristic is the possession of a gun during the 
commission of an offense. See Andersen, supra note 12, at 186 n.24. This Note will use the 
terms "specific offense characteristic" and "enhancement" interchangeably. 
15. See Smulow, supra note 11, at 437 n.3. 
16. "Upward and downward adjustments" are those characteristics of the defendant's 
conduct or harm that are not specific to the crime, but yet are aggravating or mitigating fac­
tors. These adjustments take account of, among other things, the defendant's role in the of­
fense and status of the victim. See USSG §§ 3Al.1-Bl.4. 
17. This Note does not discuss criminal history because it would add unnecessary com­
plications in the context of this discussion. 
18. The base offense level "aggravated assault" is defined in the Guidelines as "a feloni­
ous assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not 
merely to frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony." 
USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.l. 
19. See USSG § 2A2.2(a). 
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charged - increase by 5 levels; if a dangerous weapon (including a fire­
arm) was otherwise used20 - increase by 4 levels; if a dangerous 
weapon (including a firearm) was brandished or threatened - increase 
by 3 levels.21 If a defendant otherwise used a dangerous weapon to 
commit aggravated assault, a court would properly find that he is sub­
ject to a sentence corresponding to 19 levels. 
A defendant might challenge the resulting sentence if a court were 
to count any aspect of his conduct twice when applying the factors on 
the matrix. "Double counting" occurs when a court applies the Guide­
lines in a way that accounts for the same aspects of a defendant's con­
duct more than once to increase the severity of a sentence.22 A court 
might double count, for instance, if it applied a base offense level with 
a specific offense characteristic under one provision of the Guidelines, 
and subsequently enhanced that sentence by applying another provi­
sion or enhancement based on the same conduct accounted for in the 
first specific offense characteristic.23 
For example, consider a defendant who commits a robbery by re­
moving the cashier from behind the counter and tying him up in the 
bathroom. The court sentences the robber for the base offense level 
"robbery" and the specific offense characteristic "robbery involving 
restraint of the victim. "24 If the court also sentences the defendant for 
abducting the cashier under the enhancement providing: "If any per­
son was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense . . .  increase 
by 4 levels,"25 the defendant might claim that the court impermissibly 
counted the same conduct (tying up the cashier in the bathroom) 
twice: once for the restraint and once for the abduction. 
The success of a defendant's claim that a court double counted is 
not uniform throughout the federal circuits. The circuits uniformly 
consider double counting impermissible where the Guideline provision 
20. ·See supra note 2 (defining "otherwise used"). 
21. See USSG §§ 2A2.2(b)(2)(A)-(C). 
22. See United States v. Parker, 136 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (" 'Double counting' 
occurs when the Guidelines use the same conduct more than once to increase the severity of 
a sentence."); see also Gary Swearingen, Comment, Proportionality and Punishment: Double 
Counting Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 68 WASH. L. REV. 715, 718-20 (1993). 
23. See supra note 22; see also Hideaki Sano, Note, Judicial Abuse of "Process": Exam­
ining the Applicability of Section 2Fl.1 (b)(4)(B) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
Bankruptcy Fraud, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1038, 1058 (2000) (citing United States v. Campbell, 
967 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1992) for the proposition that double counting occurs when courts 
consider the same factor in setting the initial Guidelines range and in choosing to depart 
from that range; and United States v. Lincoln, 956 F.2d 1465, 1471 (8th Cir. 1992) for finding 
double counting "when one instance . . .  of a defendant's conduct forms the basis for a con­
viction . . .  and is also employed to adjust one or more other sentences"). 
24. The base offense level is "Robbery." USSG § 2B3.l. The specific offense characteris­
tic states: "if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or 
to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 2.B3.l(b)(4)(B). 
25. See USSG § 2B3.l(b)(4)(A). 
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at issue specifically prohibits it.26 If the Guideline provision does not 
specifically prohibit double counting, however, a defendant's success­
ful appeal depends on the circuit where the appeal is heard. Some cir­
cuits hold that double counting is only impermissible when the 
Guideline provision at issue specifically prohibits it.27 Other circuits 
hold that double counting is always impermissible, whether or not the 
Guideline provision specifically prohibits it.28 Finally, some circuits 
have not formulated a rule for the permissibility of double counting.29 
Whether David, who committed aggravated assault with a chair (a 
weapon this Note considers "inherently nondangerous"),30 receives the 
same sentence as Dorothy, who committed aggravated assault with a 
gun (a weapon this Note considers "inherently dangerous"), depends, 
not on the different type of weapon used,31 but on the court's view of 
26. See Smulow, supra note 11, at 455. 
27. See United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[D]ouble count­
ing a factor under different guidelines is permitted if the Commission intended that result."); 
United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Double counting is prohibited only if 
the particular guidelines at issue forbid it."); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he Sentencing Guidelines are explicit when double counting is forbidden."); 
United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]here is nothing wrong with 'dou­
ble counting' when it is necessary to make the defendant's sentence reflect the full extent of 
the wrongfulness of his conduct."); United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1992) 
("As we recently noted, '[t]he Sentencing Commission plainly understands the concept of 
double counting, and expressly forbids it where it is not intended.' " (quoting United States 
v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
28. See United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Impermissible double 
counting occurs when a district court imposes two or more upward adjustments within the 
guidelines range, when both are premised on the same conduct.''); United States v. Flinn, 18 
F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Impermissible double counting . . .  occurs when the same 
conduct on the part of the defendant is used to support separate increases under separate 
enhancement provisions which necessarily overlap . . . and serve identical purposes.''); 
United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164, 166-67 (6th Cir. 1992) (superceded by statute) 
("[T]he Commission did not intend for the same conduct to be punished cumulatively under 
separate Guidelines provisions.''); United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 
1990) ("[T]he Sentencing Commission did not intend for multiple Guidelines sections to be 
construed so as to impose cumulative punishment for the same conduct."). 
29. Compare United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) (impermissible 
double counting to use one factor to calculate both the base offense level and a specific of­
fense characteristic), with United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
a district court does not engage in impermissible doublecounting when it considers a single 
act that is relevant to two dimensions of the Guidelines analysis, but not clarifying whether 
such consideration constitutes permissible double counting, or does not constitute double 
counting at all). See United States v. Zapata, 1 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1993) (Double counting 
in the sentencing context "is a phenomenon that is less sinister than the name implies.''); 
United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) ("the Commission's ready resort to ex­
plicitly stated prohibitions against double counting signals that courts should go quite slowly 
in implying further such prohibitions where none are written.''). 
30. See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 506-07 (creating the distinction between "not an inherently 
dangerous weapon" and an "inherently dangerous weapon"); see also United States v. 
Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 189-90 (6th Cir. 1999). 
31. While some courts recognize the distinction between inherently dangerous and non­
inherently dangerous weapons, see supra note 30, the Guidelines do not distinguish between 
the types of weapons in the definition of "dangerous weapon.'' The Guidelines define "dan-
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"double counting" under the Guideline's provision for aggravated as­
sault. 
The double counting that occurs under the aggravated assault pro­
vision when an inherently nondangerous weapon was used, however, is 
somewhat unique. The aggravated assault provision, by its language 
and structure, appears to rule out double counting. When courts apply 
facts involving inherently nondangerous weapons to the aggravated 
assault provision, however, they inevitably face the opportunity to 
double count.32 Although yet to be named by courts or commentators, 
this Note refers to this phenomenon as "applied double counting." 
Stated another way, a court engages in "applied double counting" 
when it applies facts to a Guideline provision that does not appear on 
its face to support double counting, yet the resulting sentence inevita­
bly double counts aspects of the defendant's conduct. 
The federal circuits are split on the permissibility of applied double 
counting under the aggravated assault provision when a defendant 
used an inherently nondangerous weapon to assault a victim.33 The 
Second and Sixth Circuits conclude that such applied double counting 
is impermissible double counting.34 Most other circuits, however, find 
application of the second enhancement to be permissible double 
gerous weapon" as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Where 
an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, 
treat the object as a dangerous weapon." USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n. l(d). See United States v. 
Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n the proper circumstances, almost anything 
can count as a dangerous weapon, including walking sticks, leather straps, rakes, tennis 
shoes, rubber boots, dogs, rings, concrete curbs, clothes irons, and stink bombs."(citations 
omitted)). Further, the aggravated assault guideline applies to the use of any and all types of 
dangerous weapons. See USSG § 2A2.2(a) and cmt. n.1. Arguably, it may be difficult for 
some courts to distinguish between inherently dangerous weapons and inherently non­
dangerous weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 919 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Courts might define an inherently dangerous weapon to be a weapon designed to harm, for 
example a bomb, a grenade, or a machine gun. Alternatively, courts might choose to con­
sider any weapon that is generally used with premeditated intent to be inherently dangerous. 
This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
32. Part I infra provides a detailed explanation of why double counting under these cir­
cumstances is inevitable. 
33. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit determined the sentence of a defendant, Mr. Morris, who 
had driven a car at an officer of the law. See United States v. Morris, 131 F.3d 1136 (5th Cir. 
1997). The court found that to apply the enhancement because Mr. Morris "otherwise used" 
the car was not double counting. See id. at 1139. In Rhode Island, the First Circuit deter­
mined the sentence of a defendant, Mr. Garcia, who also had driven a car at an officer of the 
law. See United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994). The court there found that to ap­
ply the enhancement because Mr. Garcia "otherwise used" the car was permissible double 
counting. See id. at 11-12. In New York, the Second Circuit determined the sentence of a de­
fendant, Mr. Hudson, who had also driven a car at an officer of the law. See Hudson, 972 
F.2d at 507. The court there found that to apply the enhancement because Mr. Hudson "oth­
erwise used" the car was impermissible double counting. See id. 
34. See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; Farrow, 198 F.3d at 195. 
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counting.35 The few remaining circuits do not consider application of 
the second enhancement to be double counting at all.36 
This Note uses the example of applied double counting under the 
aggravated assault Guideline to urge courts to limit permissible double 
counting to those circumstances where the Guidelines unequivocally 
permit it. Part I compares the resulting sentences when the aggravated 
assault provision is applied to the specific facts of a defendant who 
committed aggravated assault with an inherently nondangerous 
weapon and a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an 
inherently dangerous weapon. Part I then argues that the statute's 
structure and plain language show the Commission's intent to prohibit 
the applied double counting, yet demonstrates that courts will inevita­
bly face the opportunity to double count when sentencing a defendant 
who used an inherently nondangerous weapon. Part II challenges 
some courts' reliance on a canon of statutory construction, expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius,31 in their reasoning that the Commission in­
tended applied double counting under the aggravated assault provi­
sion. Part II argues that the invocation of this canon is inappropriate in 
the context of applied double counting. Part III urges courts to refrain 
from applied double counting to avoid violating the rule of lenity: 
courts are to construe ambiguous statues in favor of the accused.38 Part 
III further urges courts to resist applied double counting because it 
violates the Commission's goal of proportionality in sentencing.39 This 
Note concludes that courts should adopt a rule whereby all double 
counting is impermissible unless the Guidelines expressly permit it. 
This way, courts will avoid applied double counting that the Commis­
sion did not anticipate or intend. 
I. THE PROVISION'S STRUCTURE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
COMMISSION DID NOT INTEND TO PERMIT 
APPLIED DOUBLE COUNTING 
Under the aggravated assault provision, applied double counting 
inevitably occurs in cases where a defendant committed aggravated as-
35. See United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sorensen, 58 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1996); Reese, 2 F.3d at 870; Duran, 
127 F.3d at 916-19. 
36. See Morris, 131 F.3d at 1138-40; United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200 (3rd Cir. 
1997); Garcia, 34 F.3d at 11. 
37. The canon holds that "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the 
other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999). 
38. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 
58 (1998). 
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1998); USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3). For an analysis of 
whether these goals are being met, see Karle & Sager, supra note 10. 
190 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:183 
sault with an inherently nondangerous weapon such as a chair or a 
tennis racket. It is apparent from the structure and language of the 
statutory provision, however, that the Commission intended the oppo­
site result: that courts count each aspect of the defendant's conduct 
only once. Section I.A demonstrates that by designing the aggravated 
assault Guideline in a structure known as a "graduated enhancement 
schedule," the Commission intended to prohibit courts from double 
counting. Section LB shows that applied double counting inevitably 
results when courts apply the second specific offense characteristic 
("when a dangerous weapon was otherwise used"), to the sentence of 
a defendant who used an inherently nondangerous weapon when 
committing aggravated assault. Section LB then argues that courts that 
apply this second specific offense characteristic under these circum­
stances contradict the Commission's intentions. 
A. The Commission Designed the Statute to A void Double Counting 
This section argues that the Commission explicitly designed the ag­
gravated assault Guideline so that when courts apply the provided 
specific offense characteristics, they do not double count any of the de­
fendant's actions. When a court applies specific offense characteristics 
to increase the sentencing level of a defendant who committed aggra­
vated assault with an inherently dangerous weapon such as a gun,40 be­
cause of the statute's structure, that court cannot double count any 
factor of the defendant's conduct or harm caused. 
First, the Guidelines provide that a defendant qualifies for the base 
offense level "aggravated assault" by "involving" a dangerous 
weapon.41 The Guidelines define aggravated assault as "a felonious as­
sault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with the intent to do bod­
ily harm, (i.e., not merely to frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or 
(C) an intent to commit another felony."42 
Then, the Commission provides a means by which courts can en­
hance the sentence of a defendant who committed aggravated assault 
according to the egregiousness of the use of the weapon involved. The 
enhancements, based on three special offense characteristics, are 
structured as what one court has termed a "graduated enhancement 
40. This Note uses a gun throughout as an example of a clear-cut "inherently danger­
ous" weapon. 
41. See USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. Commentators understand the base offense level to 
mean "mere possession." See THOMAS w. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2A2.2 (2000 ed.). Recall that the Guidelines define a dangerous 
weapon as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury." See supra 
note 31. Recall also that both a chair and a gun fall into the category of "dangerous weapon." 
42. USSG § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. See supra note 3. 
October 2000] Impermissible Double Counting 191 
schedule."43 The term is appropriate because the statute or "schedule" 
is graduated: the special offense characteristics progress in gradation 
order from least harmful to most harmful and the length of sentence 
corresponds to each level's relative harm. That is, each gradation ac­
counts for more egregious harm than the last and accordingly provides 
for a longer sentence. 
The following table illustrates the graduated enhancement sched­
ule and the conduct for which the base offense level and each specific 
offense characteristic accounts when a defendant committed an aggra­
vated assault using a gun. 
TABLEl 
GRADUATED ENHANCEMENT CONDUCT WITH AN 
SCHEDULE FOR INHERENTLY DANGEROUS 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WEAPON 
base offense level: "involving a dan- assaulting while carrying a gun in a hol-
gerous weapon" ster 
first enhancement: "brandishing or assaulting while pointing, waving or 
threatening with a dangerous threatening with a gun 
weapon" 
second enhancement: "a dangerous pistol whipping with the butt of a gun 
weapon was otherwise used" 
third enhancement: "firing a fire- assaulting while firing a gun in the air 
arm" 
A defendant who committed aggravated assault involving a dan­
gerous weapon qualifies for the base offense level by "merely pos­
sessing"44 a dangerous weapon. Consequently, when a defendant, with 
the intent to do bodily harm, assaults a victim while possessing an in­
herently dangerous weapon (for example, carries a gun in a holster), 
he commits an aggravated assault.45 A defendant incurs three addi­
tional points under the first enhancement if he brandished or threat­
ened to use the gun.46 Brandishing or threatening is different and more 
43. United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 916 (10th Cir. 1997); see United States v. 
Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507 ("incremental adjustment schedule"); Farrow, 198 F.3d at 190 ("in­
cremental adjustment schedule"). 
44. Commentators and courts understand the nature of the base offense level, "involv­
ing" a dangerous weapon, to mean "mere possession." See HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note 
41, at§ 2A2.2. 
45. USSG § 2A2.2. 
46. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(C). 
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egregious than inere possession because the gun is waved about or its 
use is threatened.4 7 
Under the second enhancement a court adds four points when "a 
dangerous weapon . . .  was otherwise used. "48 The Commission defines 
such use as "conduct that did not amount to the discharge of a firearm 
but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or 
other dangerous weapon."49 Although the Guidelines do not provide 
an example of conduct greater than brandishing but less than firing a 
firearm, commentators suggest that an applicable example might be 
striking a victim with the butt of a gun ("pistol whipping").50 If the de­
fendant "otherwise used" a gun, he receives a harsher sentence than 
he would for possession, brandishing, or threatening because other­
wise using a gun is conduct different from and more egregious than 
brandishing, threatening, and mere possession. 
Finally, the Guidelines provide that the defendant incurs five 
points if he discharged the gun.51 By providing the harshest penalty for 
firing a gun, the Commission demonstrates its value judgment that dis­
charging a firearm, even into the air, while committing an assault is 
different from and more egregious than possessing, brandishing, 
threatening, or pistol whipping. A defendant who does so is sentenced 
accordingly. 
Because of the graduated enhancement structure of the aggravated 
assault provision, when a court applies that provision to a case involv­
ing a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an inherently 
dangerous weapon (such as a gun), the court cannot double count any 
aspect of the defendant's conduct.52 When the schedule is utilized as 
47. The Commission defines "brandished" with reference to a dangerous weapon (in­
cluding a firearm) to mean "that the weapon was pointed or waved about, or displayed in a 
threatening manner." USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n.l(c). 
48. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). 
49. USSG § lBl.1, cmt. n.l(g). 
50. HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note 41, at § 2A2.2 cmt. 3a(ii) (citing USSG § lBl.1, 
cmt. n.4(d)). Case law provides further examples of conduct that courts have concluded con­
stitutes "otherwise used": United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238 (3d. Cir. 1991) (leveling a 
gun at the head of a victim at close range and verbalizing a threat to discharge the weapon); 
United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.Zd 985 (5th Cir. 1990) (both brandishing and threatening 
with a dangerous weapon). 
51. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A). 
52. The graduated enhancement schedule clearly works neatly with a gun as the exam­
ple of an inherently dangerous weapon. Other potentially inherently dangerous weapons 
such as a switchblade would fit also into the graduated enhancement schedule. For example, 
the base offense level could be carrying a hidden switchblade while assaulting a victim. The 
first enhancement could be holding the switchblade and threatening to use it while assaulting 
a victim. The third enhancement could be throwing the closed switchblade at the victim, or 
knocking the victim on the head with the handle of the switchblade. Notably, because there 
is no fourth enhancement for an inherently dangerous weapon such as a switchblade, "oth­
erwise use" might be any "use" of the weapon in the assault that is more egregious than 
brandishing or threatening. Such use might include cutting or slicing. 
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intended by its structure, it determines a defendant's sentence for ag­
gravated assault with a gun without double counting any conduct. 
Each enhancement accounts for new and more egregious conduct; no 
conduct overlaps; and each enhancement corresponds to a greater 
punishment for a greater crime. The structurevof the sentencing provi­
sion thus demonstrates the Commission's intent to avoid punishing de­
fendants twice for the same conduct. 
B. The Commission did not Intend for Applied Double Counting 
when Inherently Nondangerous Weapons were Used 
The Commission designed the aggravated assault Guideline to in­
clude a graduated enhancement schedule that corresponds to the use 
of a weapon. When courts apply the second specific offense character­
istic because a defendant "otherwise used a dangerous weapon" and 
the weapon was inherently nondangerous, courts inevitably double 
count the defendant's "use" of the weapon. The resulting double 
counting is impermissible because the graduated nature of the en­
hancement schedule falls apart. Section LB illustrates this inevitable 
applied double counting and argues that the Commission did not in­
tend for it to occur. Section l.B.1 demonstrates that when courts apply 
the second enhancement in the case of an aggravated assault with an 
inherently nondangerous weapon, the structure of the graduated en­
hancement schedule falls apart. Each level of the graduated enhance­
ment schedule no longer accounts for different and more egregious 
conduct than the last. Instead, the base offense level and the second 
enhancement double count the same conduct. Section l.B.2 examines 
the statute's plain language and illustrates that the Commission de­
fined the base offense level with the word "involving" a dangerous 
weapon, and defined the second enhancement with the phrase "oth­
erwise used" a dangerous weapon. The Commission used different 
words to describe different conduct. This section argues that in the 
context of an assault with an inherently nondangerous weapon the dif­
ference between the conduct described by the words "inv.olve" and 
"use" evaporates, resulting in the base offense level and a second en­
hancement that double count for identical conduct. As illustrated 
through the statute's structure and plain language, Section I.B.3 argues 
that the Commission intended each invocation of the defendant's con­
duct to serve a unique sentencing purpose, and thus did not intend to 
permit applied double counting. 
1. Statutory Structure 
Although the Commission designed the statute as a graduated en­
hancement schedule, a court that sentences a defendant who commit­
ted aggravated assault with a chair cannot enhance for "otherwise" 
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using the chair without double counting the "use" of the chair. When a 
court applies the second enhancement, the graduated nature of the 
enhancement schedule falls apart. 
Although courts and commentators understand that the "mere 
possession" of an inherently dangerous weapon constitutes sufficient 
use of a weapon to qualify a defendant for the base offense level of 
aggravated assault,53 the "mere possession" of an inherently nondan­
gerous weapon such as a chair only constitutes simple assault.54 A de­
fendant may possess a chair while intending to do bodily harm to 
someone by sitting on the chair while punching someone with his fists. 
Or a defendant may possess a hammer while assaulting with the intent 
to do bodily harm, simply by wearing a tool belt while pulling some­
one's hair.55 Unless the defendant uses, brandishes or threatens to use 
the inherently nondangerous weapon beyond mere possession, the de­
fendant does not qualify for the base offense level of aggravated as­
sault.56 Instead, he commits the lesser offense of minor assault.57 
Because it is the use or threatened use that transforms an inher­
ently nondangerous object into a dangerous weapon, sentencing courts 
necessarily count the use or threatened use of the object when they 
apply the base offense level of aggravated assault. In detem1ining 
when an inherently nondangerous object constitutes a dangerous 
weapon, courts have held that it is not only the object's capability of 
infliction of death or serious bodily injury, but also the instrument's 
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
54. See United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[M]ere possession of 
a car during an assault will not convert an ordinary assault into an aggravated one."); United 
States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 194 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Diana Graettinger, State Asks 
Judge if Man Out on Bail can Use Explosives: Suspect in Standoff Works with Dynamite, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 1999 (noting that when a District Attorney in a case. stated 
"[i]t is difficult for me to imagine a claim that dynamite and blasting caps . . .  are not inher­
ently dangerous," the defendant's attorney disagreed, noting that objects are only dangerous 
weapons if they are intended to be used in a manner that could cause death or serious bodily 
injury). 
55. The Sixth Circuit in Farrow used the following example to illustrate this point: "If, 
for example, Farrow had been standing next to his car and had charged at Agent Ward but 
had done him little or no harm, we would not consider his offense an 'aggravated assault' 
simply because he possessed an object (his car) that, under different circumstances, could 
have been used as a dangerous weapon." 198 F.3d at 194. 
56. Recall, however, that a defendant can qualify for aggravated assault by ways other 
than those involving a dangerous weapon. See supra note 3. If the defendant committed the 
felonious assault while attempting to commit another felony or by inflicting serious bodily 
harm, then the defendant who merely possessed a chair or a hammer could qualify for the 
base offense level of aggravated assault. This Note, however, as mentioned in the introduc­
tion, only considered a fact pattern where a defendant qualifies for aggravated assault only 
because he involved a dangerous weapon. 
57. The Guidelines define "minor assault" as "a misdemeanor assault, or a felonious 
assault not covered by§ 2A2.2." USSG § 2A2.3(a), cmt. n.1. 
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use or threatened use combined with that capability that makes it dan­
gerous.58 
For example, in United States v. Hudson, the court stated "it is the 
use or threatened use of the object which makes [an] assault aggra­
vated."59 The court similarly noted that a "defendant can not be guilty 
of assault with an non-inherently dangerous weapon . . . unless the 
object is used (or its use is threatened) in a dangerous way."60 In 
Hudson, the defendant "used" a car by driving the car toward a fed­
eral marshal and thereby qualified for the aggravated assault Guide­
line.61 Without having used the car in this manner, the defendant 
would not have transformed the car into a dangerous weapon.62 Thus, 
if an assailant drives slowly by a victim, reaches out of the window and 
punches the victim with the intent to hurt him, he commits minor as­
sault, but if he drives the car at the victim with the intent to hurt him 
with the impact of the car, he commits aggravated assault by his use of 
the car.63 Further, his use of the car is also threatening, and could be 
characterized as brandishing.64 
Because a defendant who commits aggravated assault with an in­
herently nondangerous weapon qualifies for the base offense level of 
aggravated assault due to his "use" or threatened use of the weapon, a 
court double counts if it applies the specific offense characteristic "a 
dangerous weapon was otherwise used" to the defendant's sentence. 
Recall that double counting occurs because in applying the specific of­
fense characteristic of "otherwise used," the court is not taking ac­
count of any different or more egregious conduct than has already 
been accounted for.65 If "use" is not accounted for in the base offense 
level for aggravated assault, for example when a gun is involved, the 
court does not double count when it applies the specific offense char-
58. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 106 F.3d 1092, 1095 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding 
jury instruction stating that "[a]lmost any object which, as used, or attempted to be used, 
may endanger life or inflict great bodily harm, can be a deadly or dangerous weapon"); 
United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) ("whether an object constitutes a 
dangerous weapon hinges .. . (in part] on the manner in which the object is used"); United 
States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1433 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that whether an object is 
a dangerous weapon depends on the circumstances of the case, as "the manner in which the 
object is used in the assault is determinative"); United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1166 
(8th Cir. 1988) ("Almost any weapon, as used or attempted to be used, . . .  may be a danger­
ous and deadly weapon."). 




63. See id. 
64. See supra note 47. 
65. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.· 
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acteristic "otherwise used."66 The converse, however, is also true: if 
"use" is accounted for in the base offense level, the court double 
counts when it applies the specific offense characteristic of "otherwise 
used."67 
The demolition of the graduated nature of the sentencing schedule 
is apparent.68 The following table compares conduct considered in the 
graduated enhancement schedule when a defendant committed aggra­
vated assault using an inherently dangerous weapon with the conduct 
considered when a defendant committed aggravated assault using an 
inherently nondangerous weapon. 
66. See supra Section I.A (noting that a court does not double count any conduct when it 
applies any of the three specific offense characteristics to the base offense level of a defen­
dant who commits aggravated assault with a gun). 
67. Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 812-13 
(2d Cir. 1995), amending and superceding 49 F.3d 848 (2d Cir. 1995). But see United States v. 
Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 896 n.32 (9th Cir. 1993) ("That we use a single sentencing factor 'twice' to 
trace the effects of this transformation (first to distinguish minor from aggravated assaults, 
then to distinguish more and Jess culpable aggravated assaults) is merely an accidental by­
product of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines."). Whether or not using the factor 
"twice" is "merely an accidental by-product of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines," 
this Note argues that such use constitutes impermissible double counting. 
68. The Fifth Circuit sought to avoid double counting by asserting that an inherently 
non-dangerous weapon can be "used" two different ways. See United States v. Morris, 131 
F.3d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997). In Morris, "during the course of [the] criminal episode," the 
defendant rammed his Blazer into an FBI agent's vehicle and fled from the law enforcement 
authorities "recklessly and at a high rate of speed to escape capture." Id. The court found 
that the "ramming" rendered the vehicle a dangerous weapon, and qualified the defendant 
for the aggravated assault base offense level. Id. The court further found that the subsequent 
"fleeing" constituted the "otherwise" use of the weapon. Id. While it might be possible to 
use, and otherwise use an inherently non-dangerous weapon in two different ways, note that 
"the mere fact that a bad act can be described in two different ways does not justify making 
two separate upward adjustments" under the Guidelines. United States v. Campbell, 967 
F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992). To avoid double counting the two uses must occur during the 
course of the assault. The aggravated assault guideline does not apply to the conduct unless 
the defendant used the dangerous weapon in the assault and the defendant intended to in­
flict bodily harm or commit another felony or caused serious bodily harm. See United States 
v. Hood, 210 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing USSG § 2A2.2 (2)). 
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TABLE 2 
GRADUATED CONDUCT WITH AN CONDUCT WITH AN 
ENHANCEMENT INHERENTLY INHERENTLY 
SCHEDULE DANGEROUS NONDANGEROUS 
WEAPON WEAPON 
base offense level: "in- assaulting while carrying assaulting by driving a 
volving a dangerous a gun in a holster69 car at a victim 
weapon" 
first enhancement: assaulting while pointing, assaulting by driving a 
"brandishing or waving, or threatening car at a victim 
threatening with a with a gun 
dangerous weapon" 
second enhancement: pistol whipping with the assaulting by driving a 
"a dangerous weapon butt of a gun car at a victim 
was otherwise used" 
third enhancement: assaulting while firing a no application 
"firing a firearm" firearm 
As discussed above in Section I.A, the Commission intended each 
enhancement of the graduated enhancement schedule to account for 
new and more egregious conduct. 7° Consequently, the Commission 
could not have intended the double counting that results when courts 
apply the second enhancement because "a dangerous weapon was 
otherwise used" 71 in situations where they have already accounted for 
the "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon in the base offense 
level. Instead, the structure of the graduated enhancement schedule 
demonstrates that the Commission intended the enhancements to ac­
count for new and more egregious conduct. 
2. Plain Language 
The Commission defined the base offense level for aggravated as­
sault as "involving a dangerous weapon" and the specific offense char­
acteristic as "a dangerous weapon . . .  was otherwise used." 72 Through 
its use of different wording, the Commission demonstrated that the 
base offense level and the second enhancement account for different 
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing "mere.possession"). 
70. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
71. USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). 
72. See supra note 2. 
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conduct.73 In the context of aggravated assault with an inherently 
nondangerous weapon, however, the distinction carries no meaning.74 
The difference does hold meaning when "involving" means "mere pos­
session," as in the case of aggravated assault with an inherently dan­
gerous weapon such as a gun,75 but in the case of an aggravated assault 
with an inherently nondangerous weapon, "involving" means "used"76 
and therefore "otherwise used" carries no additional meaning. 
3. Commission's Intent 
The fact that application of the second enhancement to the sen­
tence of a defendant who committed aggravated assault with an inher­
ently nondangerous weapon inevitably results in applied double 
counting does not end the inquiry because, as noted in the introduc­
tion, double counting is not always impermissible.77 This section argues 
that the inevitable applied double counting discussed in this Note is 
impermissible because the Commission did not intend for courts to 
engage in applied double counting. As already examined, the 
Commission demonstrated its intent that the enhancement schedule 
be gradual,78 thus, the Commission did not intend for the graduated 
nature of the schedule to fall apart. Also, the Commission used plain 
language to demonstrate its intent that the words "involve" and "oth­
erwise use" carry different meanings.79 Thus, the Commission did not 
intend a result where the difference between the words evaporates. 
More specifically, this section argues that applied double counting 
is impermissible because each invocation of a particular behavior fails 
to serve a unique sentencing purpose. Recall that a court double 
counts a defendant's "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon be­
cause each enhancement for the behavior accounts for the same con­
duct.80 The defendant's "use" of the weapon refers to one action -
73. See Gershon M. Ratner, The Federal Circuit's Approach to Statutory and Regulatory 
Construction, With Emphasis on Veteran's Law, 6 FED. CIR. B. J. 243, 249 (1996) ("Statutory 
language must be construed so as to give separate meaning to each word, so that no words 
are treated as mere surplusage, entirely without meaning.") (internal quotations omitted); 
see also R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court 
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 52 (1997) 
(noting that the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis provides that "words are to 
be read in context with neighboring words in the same document"). 
74. See generally United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1992). But see 
United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 206-207 (4th Cir. 1992). 
75. See supra Section I.A. 
76. See supra Section LB. 
77. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra Section l.B.l. 
79. See supra Section l.B.2. 
80. See supra Section l.B.l. 
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one harm committed by the defendant.81 This section examines the 
meaning of "unique sentencing purpose" and argues that when each 
invocation of a particular behavior does not serve a unique purpose, 
the Commission did not intend the resulting double counting.82 
Consider a situation in the Guidelines where double counting is 
permissible because the two Guidelines applied to a single action refer 
to different conceptual harms. Under the robbery provision section 
2B3.1, the base offense level can be enhanced for the specific offense 
characteristic of physical restraint.83 If the robber necessarily re­
strained the victim in order to accomplish the robbery, a coµrt that en­
hances the sentence for the restraint has double counted conduct nec­
essary for the robbery to take place. In this case, however, the double 
counting is permissible because the robbery (the actual taking of 
property), and the physical restraint (the conduct necessary to commit 
the taking of the property), constitute different and distinct harms. 
Because "robbery does not necessarily entail physical restraint,"84 it is 
possible to distinguish the physical restraint as a separate harm from 
the robbery. 
Courts must determine whether conduct used to establish the base 
offense level serves a sentencing purpose unique from the way the 
same conduct is used to establish another part of the Guideline, here, 
"otherwise using" a weapon. The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in 
United States v. Reese.85 In Reese, the defendant housing authority po­
lice officer struck the victim on the head with a flashlight, an inher­
ently nondangerous weapon. In doing so, the defendant seriously in­
jured the victim. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that 
the district court double counted the use of the flashlight when it ap­
plied the enhancement for "otherwise using" the flashlight. In his 
analysis of the double counting issue presented in Reese, Judge 
O'Scannlain determined that it is impermissible double counting to 
"use a single aspect of conduct both to determine [the base offense 
81. See United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 813 (2d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992). 
82. See United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("(M]ultiple uses of a par­
ticular aspect of a defendant's past behavior are proper where each invocation of the par­
ticular behavior serves a unique purpose under the Guidelines.") (quoting United States v. 
Starr, 971 F.2d 357, 361 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 
1161 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that double counting is permissible if "each section concerns 
conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing") (quoting United States v. Aimufa, 935 
F.2d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(noting that double counting is permissible "where a single act is relevant to two dimensions 
of the Guideline analysis"). 
83. See supra note 20. 
84. Reese, 2 F.3d at 895 (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 
1992)) (cataloging examples of cases where double counting was permissible because two 
different harms were accounted for in the sentencing). 
85. Id. 
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level] and to increase the base offense level mandated thereby . . .  
[where] absent such conduct, it is impossible to come within that 
guideline. "86 
Thus, at least in the Ninth Circuit, if a court uses the same conduct 
both to qualify the defendant for a base offense level and to increase 
that base level with a specific offense characteristic, the court imper­
missibly double counts unless the defendant could have qualified for 
the base offense level due to any other unique conduct. In Reese, the 
defendant housing authority police officer both "otherwise used" a 
flashlight to strike a suspect on the head, and "inflict[ ed] serious bod­
ily injury"87 on the victim. As a result, the Ninth Circuit court noted 
that since the defendant could have come under the Guideline by con­
duct other than his "use" of the flashlight, the double counting was 
permissible.88 The result in Reese makes sense: the defendant there en­
gaged in at least two of the types of conduct for which one may qualify 
for the aggravated assault Guideline, so enhancing a sentence when 
the flashlight was "otherwise used" was not impermissible double 
counting. Accordingly, this Note urges courts to find double counting 
impermissible if a sentencing court uses a single aspect of conduct (the 
use of the dangerous weapon) both to determine the applicable base 
offense level (aggravated assault) and to apply an enhancement (oth­
erwise using a dangerous weapon) where, absent the use of the dan­
gerous weapon, it was impossible for the defendant to come within the 
base offense level Guideline.89 
When the facts of an aggravated assault involving the use of an in­
herently nondangerous weapon are applied to the Ninth Circuit's test, 
the result is as follows: It would be permissible double counting for a 
defendant who seriously injured a victim with a chair to be sentenced 
for otherwise using the chair because he qualified for aggravated as­
sault as a result of the inflicted injury. Similarly, it would be permissi­
ble double counting for a defendant who committed the aggravated 
assault with the chair in the midst of an attempted bank robbery to be 
sentenced for otherwise using the chair because he qualified for aggra­
vated assault as a result of his attempt to commit another felony. In 
the factual scenario addressed in this Note, however, the defendant 
neither inflicts serious bodily harm on the victim nor attempts to 
86. Id. 
87. Recall that there are three ways to come within the aggravated assault guideline ac­
cording to the definition of aggravated assault. "Aggravated assault" is "a felonious assault 
that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to 
frighten), or (B) serious bodily injury, or (C) an intent to commit another felony." USSG § 
2A2.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added). 
88. Reese, 2 F.3d at 895. 
89. See id. 
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commit another felony.90 As a result, according to the Ninth Circuit's 
test, it is impossible for the defendant to qualify for the base offense 
level other than for the "use" of the chair. The Commission could not 
have intended courts to double count where each invocation of "use" 
does not serve a unique purpose.91 
II. COURTS SHOULD NOT USE THE CANON EXPRESSIO UN/US EST 
EXCL USIO ALTERIUS92 TO PERMIT APPLIED DOUBLE COUNTING 
This section challenges some courts' conclusions that the Commis­
sion intended applied double counting because it expressly prohibited 
double counting elsewhere in the Guidelines, but did not forbid it un­
der the aggravated assault Guideline. These courts rely on the canon 
of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (hereinaf­
ter "expressio unius") . This section argues that reliance on this canon 
is inappropriate in the context of applied double counting. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
91. Unfortunately, subsequent courts have applied the test articulated in Reese, 2 F.3d 
870, in a manner that does not appear to make sense. In Reese the defendant did in fact have 
the intent to commit another felony and used a non-inherently dangerous weapon to commit 
an aggravated assault. Id. at 895-96. In that case it was appropriate for the defendant to have 
points applied to his sentence for each harmful act. The court in Duran, however, interpreted 
the reasoning in Reese to mean that, unless there is no other way for any hypothetical defen­
dant to qualify for the aggravated assault guideline other than his use of a dangerous 
weapon, only then can there be impermissible double counting of the "use" conduct. United 
States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 917 (10th Cir. 1997). 
According to these courts' interpretation of the Ninth Circuit's language, unless it is im­
possible to qualify for aggravated assault in any way other than involving a dangerous 
weapon, there can be no impermissible double counting of the "use of the dangerous 
weapon." See, e.g. , Duran, 127 F.3d at 917; United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617, 619 (8th 
Cir. 1996). 
In application, this means that because there are two additional ways a defendant might 
qualify for the aggravated assault guideline, because the defendant committed another fel­
ony or inflicted bodily injury, see supra note 82; see also United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 
179, 193 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit rule that "a guideline raises no 
double counting concerns so Jong as it is capable of being applied in some hypothetical case 
without counting the same conduct twice"), a court always will permissibly double count the 
"use" of an inherently non-dangerous weapon. 
The error of this extrapolation is plain. A defendant who qualified for the base offense 
level by committing a felonious assault with the intent to commit another felony and also 
used an inherently non-dangerous weapon would receive 19 points (15 for the base offense 
level and 4 for the enhancement because a dangerous weapon was "otherwise used"). See 
USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). At the same time, a defendant who qualified for the base offense 
level by using a dangerous weapon but could theoretically have qualified for the base level 
by having the intent to commit another felony (even though he did not have the intent) 
would also receive 19 points (15 for committing aggravated assault involving a dangerous 
weapon and 4 because he otherwise used a dangerous weapon). See id. ; see also Duran, 127 
F.3d at 917. One defendant has committed two serious offenses, the other has committed 
only one. The Ninth Circuit's language as erroneously used by other courts, creates, rather 
than alleviates, disproportionality in sentencing. See infra Section III.B (discussing the 
Commission's goal of proportionality in sentencing). 
92. See supra note 37 (defining the canon: "to express or include one thing implies the 
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative"). 
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Throughout the Guidelines, the Commission recognized certain in­
stances where double counting could occur and expressly prohibited 
the double counting. Section II.A asserts that these express prohibi­
tions are overt whereas applied double counting is, by definition, a 
phenomenon that is not plain on the face of the statute because it only 
occurs through application.93 Thus, courts that rely on the canon make 
an unrealistic assumption that the Commission recognized every po­
tential instance of double counting in the Guidelines. Section 11.B 
points out that the Guidelines both expressly permit and prohibit dou­
ble counting, and thus argues that the canon, in this context, is mean­
ingless. 
A. Expressio Unius is Inappropriate when Double 
Counting is As Applied 
Throughout the Guidelines, the Commission prohibited certain in­
stances of potential double counting.94 Using the canon of expressio 
unius, some courts have argued that by including provisions that ex­
pressly forbid double counting, the Commission demonstrated that it 
understood the potential for double counting.95 This section argues 
that this reliance on expressio unius is inappropriate because applied 
double counting is distinguishable from the instances of double 
counting that the Guidelines expressly prohibit. As Section I.A dem­
onstrated, the double counting involved in an enhancement for other­
wise using, brandishing, or threatening with a dangerous weapon is not 
apparent from the face of the statute. In contrast, as this section will 
show, the instances of double counting that the Commission explicitly 
bars are overt and easily recognizable. Therefore, the omission of an 
express prohibition of double counting more readily signifies an over­
sight on the part of the Commission, rather than the intent to permit 
applied double counting. 
93. See Introduction (defining "applied double counting"). 
94. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 720 (cataloging instances of explicitly prohibited 
double counting). For example, it is impermissible for courts to apply the adjustment en­
hancement for a vulnerable victim if the definition of the offense or the specific offence 
characteristic includes that vulnerability. USSG § 3Al.1 cmt. 2; USSG § 2A3.l(b)(2); see also 
United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 672 (1st Cir. 1992) (cataloging instances of express 
prohibition of double counting). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 212 (3d. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he princi­
ple of statutory construction, expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius applies. Following these 
principles, we conclude that the exclusion of a double counting provision in the [certain] sec­
tions . . .  was by design. Accordingly, an adjustment that clearly applies to the conduct of an 
offense must be imposed unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability.") (second emphasis 
added) (quoting Wong, 3 F.3d at 670-71). For cases relying on the concept of the canon, but 
not the canon itself, see United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 205, 208 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Curtis 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 243 (5th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Goolsby, 908 F.2d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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An example of overt double counting that is easily recognizable 
because it could result from every factual application occurs in section 
2X3.1 of the Guidelines.96 That provision sets the base offense level for 
an offender who participates only as an accessory to a crime after the 
fact.97 The base offense level for an accessory to a crime is set lower 
than the base offense level for a principal offender.98 The application 
notes99 to that provision provide that "an adjustment for reduced cul­
pability is incorporated in the base offense level. "100 The Commission 
thereby made it clear that courts are prohibited from double counting 
the factor of reduced culpability of an accessory. Without this express 
provision, courts might count reduced culpability twice: once, as it is 
incorporated into the relatively low base offense level, and a second 
time to further reduce the sentence because factors involving reduced 
culpability in other crimes can mitigate the sentence.101 This instance of 
potential double counting is overt. Most likely, the Commission easily 
recognized it because every defendant who is an accessory rather than 
a principal participant in a crime will have reduced culpability.102 
Another overt example of expressly prohibited double counting 
that raises the offense level occurs in section 2Cl.1 of the 
Guidelines, 103 where the Commission sets the base level for extortion 
under color of official right. The application notes to the section in­
struct the sentencing court not to apply the adjustment under section 
3Bl.3 for abuse of a position of trust.104 Presumably courts are so in­
structed because the base level for extortion under color of official 
right necessarily contemplates such an abuse.105 Again, this instance of 
potential double counting is obvious because extortion under color of 
official right will necessarily be committed by official persons in posi­
tions of trust. Consequently, such a crime will almost always be a di­
rect result of an abuse of a position of trust. 
96. USSG § 2X3.1. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. The Application Notes are designed to assist courts in interpreting Guideline provi­
sions. See USSG § lBl.7. Courts are required, however, to follow application notes. See 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ("commentary is a binding interpretation"); 
United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 372 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
100. USSG § 2X3.1, cmt. n.2. 
101. For example, under the aggravated assault guideline, a sentence is mitigated for the 
assailant's reduced culpability if the assailant did not inflict serious bodily injury. 
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
103. USSG § 2Cl.1. 
104. USSG § 2Cl.1 cmt. n.3. 
105. See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing USSG §§ 
2Cl.1, cmt. n.3, 3Al.1 cmt. n.2, 3Al.2 cmt. n.3, 3Al.3 cmt. n.2, all expressly forbidding the 
sentencing court from applying the adjustment if the offense provision specifically incorpo­
rates that factor); see also Swearingen, supra note 22, at 719-20. 
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In such instances where the Commission expressly prohibited dou­
ble counting, a court would likely read the plain language of the stat­
ute to require double counting even without an express prohibition. 
Unlike instances of applied double counting, these instances do not 
require the application of a number of different fact scenarios to ex­
pose the potential for double counting. In contrast, the case of a de­
fendant who commits aggravated assault with an inherently nondan­
gerous weapon who neither inflicts serious bodily injury nor intends to 
commit another felony is not an obvious fact pattern. Nor, when one 
views the aggravated assault Guideline and its graduated enhancement 
schedule, does one immediately become cognizant of the potential for 
double counting that the Guideline presents. Courts that rely on ex­
pressio unius argue that the Commission recognized this potential for 
double counting, and determined that it was permissible.106 Because it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to contem­
plate every fact pattern with every type of weapon to determine 
whether certain facts applied to the Guidelines would result in double 
counting, it seems unrealistic to presume that if the Commission did 
not include an express prohibition of applied double counting, it in­
tended the applied double counting.107 
Contrary to the above examples of expressly forbidden double 
counting, the plain language and natural application of the aggravated 
assault Guideline do not display an overt instance of the potential for 
double counting, even though in application the statute does in fact 
lead to this result.108 In fact, as noted in Section l .A, a fact pattern that 
comes to mind when reading the plain language of the aggravated as­
sault Guideline is the case of aggravated assault with a dangerous 
weapon such as a gun, particularly because the graduated enhance­
ment schedule culminates with the firing of a firearm.109 It is realistic to 
assume that the Commission overlooked the potential double counting 
that could result in the case of an aggravated assault with an inherently 
nondangerous weapon without serious bodily injury or intent to com­
mit another felony. To have detected the potential for applied double 
counting, the Commission would have had to imagine assaults with a 
variety of dangerous and inherently nondangerous weapons.U0 The 
Commission would also have had to imagine fact scenarios under the 
106. See supra note 95. 
107. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 733 ("Courts have recognized that they should 
use the canon with care because it is an uncertain guide to legislative intent and is often 
based on an unfounded assumption that the legislature considered and rejected all factors.") 
(citing McKenna v. Ortho Pharm., 622 F.2d 657, 667 (3d Cir. 1980); Tri-State Terminals, Inc., 
v. Jesse, 596 E2d 752, 755 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
108. See supra Section I.A; see also tbl.2. 
109. See USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A); see also tbl.l. 
1 10. See Swearingen, supra note 22, at 731-33. 
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Guideline involving each weapon in a variety of situations, including 
where the defendant does not inflict serious bodily harm and does not 
attempt to commit another felony. Given the relative complexity of 
the facts addressed in this Note, and the seemingly straightforward na­
ture of the aggravated assault Guidelines' graduated enhancement 
schedule, it is unlikely that the Commission contemplated the possi­
bility of applied double counting. 
Courts relying on expressio unius in the context of applied double 
counting overlook the fact that it is unlikely that the Commission was 
aware of the possibility for applied double counting under the aggra­
vated assault Guideline pursuant to a particular fact pattern. Instead, 
this Note urges courts to adhere to the Supreme Court's rationale in 
Standefer v. United States, a case deciphering congressional intent from 
committee reports: The Commission should not be held responsible 
for an unintended result pursuant to expressio unius, because the 
Commission, like Congress in Standefer, should not have been ex­
pected to "identify all of the 'weeds' which are being excised from the 
garden. "111 
B.  Expressio Unius is Meaningless Because it  Cuts Both Ways 
The second reason that expressio unius cannot be applied to argue 
that provisions lacking express prohibitions on double counting should 
be construed to permit double counting is that the canon cuts both 
ways. The Guidelines include both express provisions prohibiting dou­
ble counting112 and express provisions permitting double counting.113 
For example, in the provision for an illegal alien found in the country 
after deportation,114 the Commission states "[a]n adjustment . . .  for a 
prior felony conviction applies in addition to any criminal history 
points added for [the . identical) conviction in [the Criminal History 
Chapter)."115 When a defendant argues that a court double counted a 
111. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 n.12 (1980) ("It is not necessary for 
Congress in its committee reports to identify all of the 'weeds' which are being excised from 
the garden."). 
112. See, e.g. , USSG § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2 ("Where a sentence under this section is imposed 
in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense characteristic 
for the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm. (e.g., §§ 2B3.l(b)(2)(A)-(F) 
(Robbery)) is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense.")). 
113. See, e.g., USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A), cmt. n.4; see also USSG § lBl.1 cmt. n.4 ("Ab­
sent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments from the different guideline sections are 
to be applied cumulatively (added together). For example, the adjustments from 
§ 2Fl.l(b)(2) (more than minimal planning) and § 3Bl.1 (Aggravating Role) are applied 
cumulatively."); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
Congress intended to impose multiple punishments for the same conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 
2119, which outlaws car jacking, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which prohibits the use of a firearm 
in a crime of violence). 
114. This conduct is illegal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). 
115. USSG § 2Ll.2(b)(l)(A) cmt. n.4 (emphasis added). 
206 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:183 
prior felony conviction under this provision, courts uphold the convic­
tion, concluding that the Guidelines expressly permit the double 
counting.116 
Because some provisions of the Guidelines prohibit double count­
ing and some provisions permit it, the canon can be used by propo­
nents of either side of the argument. Courts can contend that because 
the Commission expressly prohibited double counting in certain provi­
sions, silent provisions demonstrate the Commission's intent to permit 
double counting for those provisions. Courts can also contend that be­
cause the Commission included at least one express provision permit­
ting double counting, the Commission intended silent provisions to 
prohibit double counting. As a result of this ambivalence, the canon in 
this context is meaningless. 
III. EVEN IF PERMISSIBLE, COURTS SHOULD DECLINE TO CONDUCT 
APPLIED DOUBLE COUNTING BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
The Commission designed the Guidelines to promote uniformity, 11 7 
fairness,118 and proportionality119 in sentencing. This section argues that 
double counting the "use" of an inherently nondangerous weapon con­
tradicts these goals, and courts should therefore refrain from enhanc­
ing the sentence of a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently 
nondangerous weapon. 
As discussed in Section l.B, when a court enhances the sentence of 
a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently nondangerous 
weapon, the graduated nature of the Guideline's enhancement sched­
ule falls apart. When courts encounter a situation where a sentencing 
provision's structure falls apart, the likely result is confusion among 
the courts and lack of uniformity in sentencing nationwide.12° Section 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 698 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) 
("The plain language of the [note accompanying the guideline provision) suggests that such 
double counting is permissible."); United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1159 (11th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Swearingen, supra 
note 22, at 720. 
117. "Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide dis­
parity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offense committed by similar offenders." 
USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 
1990) ("Uniformity in sentencing was undeniably a primary goal of Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission."). 
118. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3) ("The [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984)'s basic objective 
was to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effec­
tive, fair sentencing system."). 
119. "[C)ongress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes 
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity." USSG ch. 1, pt. 
A(3). 
120. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
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III.A asserts that the confusion created when courts face facts result­
ing in applied double counting is sufficient grounds to sentence with 
lenity, and that if all courts sentenced with lenity, uniformity would be 
achieved.121 Section 111.B contends that because Congress deems 
crimes with inherently dangerous weapons, (e.g., guns), more danger­
ous than crimes with inherently nondangerous weapons, (e.g., chairs), 
to apply the same sentence for both crimes is contrary to the 
Commission's goals of fairness and proportionality in sentencing. 
A. Courts Should Apply the Rule of Lenity 
The rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute[s] . . .  
be construed in favor of the accused."122 Criminal statutes are tradi­
tionally construed according to the rule of lenity, a name given to a 
common law principle that "penal statutes should be strictly construed 
against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penal­
ties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be 
imposed."123 The purpose of the rule of lenity is to provide adequate 
notice to defendants and to reinforce the notion that only the legisla­
ture has the power to define what conduct is criminal and what con­
duct is not.124 This section argues that the rule of lenity is appropriate 
in the context of applied double counting for two reasons. Section 
111.A.1 argues that applied double counting is an appropriate context 
for lenity because, by its nature, applied double counting involves 
statutory ambiguity. Section 111.A.2 asserts that if courts apply the rule 
of lenity and refrain from double counting when facts, as applied to a 
statute, might lead to double counting, the goals of the rule would be 
satisfied: sentencing with fair-warning and allowing Congress, not 
courts, to determine when defendants should receive cumulative sen­
tences. 
121. It is true that uniformity would be achieved by the uniform application of the 
higher of two possible sentences, (e.g., if all courts engaged in applied double counting). 
Such a result, however, is inconsistent with the rule of lenity which instructs courts to apply 
the more lenient of two possible sentences when the sentencing statute is ambiguous. The 
rule of lenity is discussed in detail below. 
· 
122. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n.17 (1994). 
123. Solan, supra note 38, at 58 (quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed. 1992)). Black's Law Dictionary defines "rule 
of lenity" as: "The judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal 
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishment, should resolve the ambiguity in 
favor of the more lenient punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332-33 (7th ed. 1999). 
124. See Solan, supra note 38, at 58 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi­
ties for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995) (mentioning the rationales)). 
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1 .  Applied Double Counting Results in Statutory Ambiguity 
When faced with the ambiguity of double counting as applied when 
a defendant "otherwise used" an inherently nondangerous weapon to 
commit aggravated assault, courts should apply the rule of lenity. The 
rule of lenity applies if a Guideline is ambiguous as to the appropriate 
sentence, and courts give the defendant the benefit of the lower sen­
tence.125 In the context of applied double counting discussed in this 
Note, courts would apply only the base offense and refrain from en­
hancing under the second specific offense characteristic. 
While courts are not to invoke the rule of lenity haphazardly,126 
lenity is appropriate in cases of applied double counting because the 
structure and plain language of the applicable statutes lead to grievous 
ambiguity.127 On its face, the structure and language of the aggravated 
assault Guideline establishes a clear graduated enhancement sched­
ule.128 When applied to the situation of a defendant who used an in­
herently nondangerous weapon to commit aggravated assault, how­
ever, the structure of the Guideline disintegrates129 and the language of 
the Guideline seems to call for double counting.130 If applying a 
Guideline to a fact pattern gamers a result different from the outcome 
plainly called for on the face of the statute, the Guideline is ambiguous 
because it will likely be understood in different ways.131 
125. See United States v. Luna-Diaz, 222 F.3d 1, 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that where 
a Guideline provision is ambiguous, the rule of lenity should be invoked to resolve the ambi­
guity in favor of the criminal defendant); see also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 
(1958); United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting the rule of lenity 
for interpretation of Guidelines). 
126. The rule of lenity is not applicable unless "there is a grievous ambiguity or uncer­
tainty in the language and structure of the Act." United States v. Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 140 
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). It is a rule of last resort. See Wilson, 10 
F.3d at 736. Thus, the mere assertion of an alternative interpretation is not sufficient to bring 
the rule into play. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
127. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 1999) ("A rule against dou­
ble counting is also consistent with the general rule of lenity in criminal cases."). This Note 
argues that there is uncertainty in the meaning of the language "otherwise used" in the con­
text of an inherently non-dangerous weapon. This Note also argues that there is grievous 
ambiguity in the structure of the statute as applied to the facts, thus, use of the rule of lenity 
is appropriate. 
128. See USSG § 2A2.2(b) and supra Section I.A, tbl.l. 
129. See supra Section I.B.1, tbl.2. 
130. See supra Section I.B; see also United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 894 (9th Cir. 
1993) ("[O]n its face this Guidelines section clearly requires the 'double counting' of which 
appellants complain here."). 
131. Black's Law Dictionary defines "ambiguity" as "[a]n uncertainty of meaning or in­
tention, as in a contractual term or statutory provision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th 
ed. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary also quotes RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 76-77 (1976) as follows: 
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2. In the Context of Applied Double Counting, Application of Lenity 
Satisfies the Rule's Goals 
The goals of the rule of lenity are satisfied if courts apply the rule 
in the context of applied double counting: providing fair-warning in 
sentencing and allowing legislators, not courts, to determine when de­
fendants should receive cumulative sentences.132 The first goal, fair­
warning in sentencing, would be satisfied by the application of the rule 
of lenity to this case.133 As it stands now, a person in David's position 
may not know that he is subject to sentencing for aggravated assault 
with a three level enhancement because he "otherwise used" a chair in 
a bar fight, while a person like Dorothy, who pistol whipped with a 
gun, might have a good idea that serious punishment will ensue. Fair­
ness exists when the community knows "what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed."134 Without the rule of lenity, David has no idea, 
when he is in the bar with the chair raised, that the consequences of his 
actions could be to receive a sentence as harsh as the sentence re­
ceived by one who pistol whips a victim with a gun. If courts apply the 
rule of lenity here, the resulting sentence will appropriately corre­
spond to David's understanding of the punishment he deserves for the 
crime he committed. 
The second goal of the rule of lenity would also be satisfied were 
courts to apply the rule when faced with the opportunity to double 
In the context of statutory interpretation the word most frequently used to indicate the 
doubt which a judge must entertain before he can search for and, if possible, apply a secon­
dary meaning is "ambiguity". In ordinary language this term is often confined to situations in 
which the same word is capable of meaning two different things, but, in relation to statutory 
interpretation, judicial usage sanctions the application of the word "ambiguity" to describe 
any kind of doubtful meaning of words, phrases or !onger statutory provisions. Hinchy's case 
prompted the suggestion that if, in a particular context, words convey to different judges a 
different range of meanings "derived from, not fanciful speculations or mistakes about lin­
guistic usage, but from true knowledge about the use of words, they are ambiguous. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 1999). 
132. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971): 
This principle [of lenity] is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition. 
First, 'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning 
fair, so fair as possible the line should be clear.' Second, because of the seriousness of crimi­
nal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation 
of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. 
Id. at 348 (citations omitted); see also David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Envi­
ronmental Enforcers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 931 (1996); Swearingen, supra note 22, at 
728. 
133. See United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990) ("This policy of 
lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the 
penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more 
than a guess as to what Congress intended." (citing Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 
179 (1958) ). 
134. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348. 
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count. The rule of lenity is based in part on the notion that courts pre­
sume that legislators do not intend to impose multiple punishments for 
one offense unless the legislators clearly express an intent to do so.135 
This presumption comes from the fact that society does not want peo­
ple to be punished unless lawmakers have clearly delineated the law.136 
Lenity allows the legislature, not the courts, to determine when sen­
tences should be applied cumulatively.13 7 
In the case of a defendant who "otherwise used" an inherently 
nondangerous weapon, legislative intent for cumulative sentencing is 
unknown. Perhaps the Commission intended to prohibit double 
counting, given that the structure of the aggravated assault provision 
implies graduated enhancement without double counting. Or maybe 
the Commission intended the double counting that inevitably results 
when certain facts are applied to the statute. When legislative intent 
clearly appears to lead to two different results, lenity is appropriate.138 
Courts should assume that the Commission intended not to impose 
cumulative sentences like double counting, and thus give defendants 
the lower sentence. If the legislators object, they can clarify the law to 
call specifically for applied double counting. 
B .  Proportionality in Sentencing Demands that Courts 
Refrain from Double Counting as Applied: 
Gun Crimes are Worse than Chair Crimes 
Courts that engage in applied double counting to sentence chair­
wielding attackers identically to gun-wielding attackers for less serious 
conduct frustrate the Commission's goal of proportionality in sen­
tencing.139 This section argues that a more lenient sentence for chair-
135. See Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1017 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 
(1980); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955)). 
136. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (noting that the policy of allowing Congress, not the 
courts, to determine criminal sentences, and forcing Congress to write laws clearly, embodies 
"the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly 
said they should") (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 209 (1967)). 
137. See Romano, 910 F.2d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[I]mposing a rule against double 
counting is consistent with Supreme Court decisions that have required a clear expression of 
legislative intent to apply sentence enhancement provisions cumulatively." (citing Busic v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 12-13 
(1978))). 
138. See Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1017 ("Congress does not intend to impose multiple 
punishments for one offense unless it clearly expresses an intent to do so.") (citing, inter alia, 
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689; Bell, 349 U.S. at 84); see also Romano, 910 F.2d at 167. 
139. Double counting "frustrate[s] the structure of the Guidelines and their goal of en­
suring the proportionality of federal sentences." United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 
213 (3rd Cir. 1997). See United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("When more 
than one kind of harm is attributable to a given aspect of a defendant's conduct, failure to 
enhance his punishment for each harm caused thereby would defeat the Commission's goal 
of proportionality of sentencing."). 
October 2000] Impermissible Double Counting 211 
wielding attackers is appropriate because a contrary result is dispro­
portionate to the crime, and thus contrary to legislative intent. 
The Commission developed the Guidelines in part to promote 
proportionality in sentencing,140 so that the punishment imposed would 
fit the crime committed.141 The Commission sought to address propor­
tionality because of the variable nature of sentencing prior to the crea­
tion of the Guidelines. Criminals convicted of lesser crimes were sub­
ject to the real possibility that they might receive a longer sentence 
than would a criminal convicted of a more egregious crime.142 The 
Commission, in drafting the Guidelines, intended to end this injustice 
by creating a system where the length or type of punishment corre­
sponded to the seriousness of the crime committed.143 Further, the 
Commission hoped to heighten the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system in the eyes of the public by curtailing prison sentences that ap­
peared vastly disproportionate to the offense committed.144 Thus, the 
Guidelines seek to punish a defendant for "all harm that resulted from 
the acts and omissions" for which he is responsible.145 
Applied double counting frustrates the legislative goal of propor­
tionality in sentencing, and thus courts should avoid it.146 Each defen­
dant who commits a felonious assault involving a dangerous weapon, a 
gun or a chair, with the intent to commit bodily harm, should receive 
15 points for aggravated assault.147 If, however, a court double counts 
the "use" of a chair (once to qualify for the base offense level "in­
volve" and again for the second enhancement "otherwise using"), and 
only single counts the "use" of the gun (counts "possession" of the 
gun, and then counts pistol whipping),148 but gives both defendants the 
same enhancement for "otherwise using" the weapon, the resulting 
sentences are disproportionate. The defendant who "used" the chair 
to qualify for the base offense level (but did nothing else with it) and 
the defendant who possessed the gun to qualify (and pistol whipped 
his victim) would both receive 19 points.149 
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1988); USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also supra note 139; 
United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 918 (10th Cir. 1997). 
141. Swearingen, supra note 22, at 715. 
142. Karle & Sager, supra note 10, at 395-96. 
143. See, e.g. , id. ; Andersen, supra note 12, at 185. 
144. Karle & Sager, supra note 10, at 396 (noting the view that "sentencing was more a 
product of a lottery than a rational punishment scheme undermined public confidence in, 
and respect for, the criminal justice system"). 
145. USSG § 1Bl.3(a)(3). 
146. See, e.g. , United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1999). 
147. The court should apply the base offense level for aggravated assault. See USSG § 
2A2.2. 
148. See supra Section l.B.1 tbl.2. 
149. See id. 
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The Guidelines provide a graduated enhancement schedule that 
makes sense when there is an aggravated assault with a gun.15° Courts 
therefore know what sentence to give to a defendant who committed 
aggravated assault with a gun. If a court grants the identical sentence 
to a defendant who attacks with a chair or a car, the result is dispro­
portionate sentencing. This is even clearer where an attacker who 
throws a chair or drives a car at a victim receives the same sentence as 
an attacker who pistol whips a victim.151 
Sentencing criminals more leniently for attacking with chairs rather 
than guns satisfies the Commission's goal of proportionality in sen­
tencing. This section argues that because legislators generally treat gun 
crimes more harshly in other contexts, treating gun crimes more 
harshly in the applied double counting context would be proportion­
ate, and in accord with the legislative intent. 
Legislators generally treat crimes with inherently dangerous weap­
ons, such as guns,152 more harshly than crimes with other, inherently 
nondangerous objects. The Commission views crimes involving guns to 
be worthy of harsher treatment in sentencing than crimes involving 
other weapons. First, the Commission often sets the highest weapon 
enhancement for "discharging a firearm."153 Further, other graduated 
enhancement schedules in the Guidelines set harsher sentences for 
crimes involving firearms than for crimes involving other weapons.154 
The Commission devoted an entire section of the Guidelines exclu-
150. See supra Section I.A tbl.l. 
151. That is, he receives the same sentence assuming the pistol-whipping does not seri­
ously injure the victim. See supra Section I.B.l tbl.2. 
152. While this Note does not attempt to draw the line between "inherently dangerous" 
and "non-inherently dangerous" weapons, see supra note 31, weapons like bombs, grenades, 
and automatic weapons probably qualify as inherently dangerous. They serve no purpose 
other than violence. A chair, a hammer, a tennis racket, or even a kitchen knife have inher­
ent uses other than violence, and may be used in the heat of the moment in a way that a gun 
or a bomb probably cannot be so used. This section discusses legislative intent with regard to 
guns as a clear example of an inherently dangerous weapon. 
153. See, e.g., USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A); USSG § 2Ll.l(b)(4)(A) (the Guideline provi­
sion for Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien sets the highest en­
hancement "if a firearm was discharged"). 
154. See, e.g. , USSG § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A), Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious 
Damage (setting up a graduated enhancement schedule whereby the harshest penalty, an 
increase of seven points, corresponds to firearm discharge, a six point increase when a fire­
arm is "otl!erwise used," a five point increase when a firearm was brandished, displayed, or 
possessed, a four point increase when a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, and a three 
point increase when a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed); The 
Robbery graduated enhancement schedule makes it even clearer that the Commission views 
firearm use as a crime worthy of harsher punishment than the use of other weapons. See 
USSG § 2B3.l(b)(2)(A) (if a firearm was discharged, add 7 points; if a firearm was otherwise 
used, add 6 points; if a firearm was brandished, displayed or possessed, add 5 points; if a 
dangerous weapon was otherwise used, add 4 points; if a dangerous weapon was brandished, 
displayed, or possessed, add 3 points). 
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sively to firearms.155 Also, the Commission sets enhancements for 
Armed Career Criminals based on a defendant's use or possession of 
firearms, not other weapons.156 
Furthermore, the use of a gun suggests premeditation, unlike the 
use of a chair,157 and the Commission makes crimes involving premedi­
tation worthy of harsher sentences than crimes lacking premedita­
tion.158 Presumably, an attacker who used a gun planned to carry a 
gun. He intended to pull the gun · out with the intent to involve that 
gun in the assault to do bodily harm. Dorothy, wielding a gun, should 
not receive the same sentence as David, who did not carry a gun into 
the fray, who did not pull out a gun in order to involve it in the assault, 
and who did not use a gun with the intent to inflict bodily harm. David 
grabbed the first object available to him, a chair. 
Apart from the Guidelines, as demonstrated by the many bills in 
Congress seeking to promote gun control and safety,159 legislators view 
gun violence, and the potential for gun violence, as a major concern160 
155. See USSG § 2K2, Offenses Involving Public Safety. For an example of the way the 
Commission views firearm involvement in crime, see USSG § 2K2.l. Under this section, the 
Commission sets base offense levels for unlawful receipt, possession, or transportation of 
firearms or ammunition and prohibited transactions involving firearms or ammunition when 
the crimes involve certain specific types of firearms. See USSG § 2K2.l(a). The Commission 
further sets increases in points based on the number of firearms that were involved in the 
crime. See USSG § 2K2.l(b)(l). Further, under the guideline for Possession of Firearm or 
Dangerous Weapon in Federal Facility; Possession or Discharge of Firearm in School Zone, 
USSG § 2K2.5, the Commission includes a specific offense characteristic where a "defendant 
unlawfully possessed or caused any firearm to be present in a school zone." USSG § 
2K2.S(b)( l)(B). There is no similar enhancement for possessing other dangerous weapons in 
a school zone. 
156. See USSG §§ 4B l.4(b)(3)(A), 4B l.4(c)(2). 
157. See supra note 31 (discussing the role of premeditation). 
158. See, e.g., USSG § 2Al.1, cmt. n.l. The Commission concludes in the application 
notes to the first degree murder guideline that "in the absence of capital punishment life im­
prisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditated killing." 
159. See, e.g., S. 1190, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill to apply the Consumer Product Safety 
Act to firearms and ammunition) (introduced in Senate June 9, 1999); American Handgun 
Standards Act of 1999, H.R. 2009, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 193, 106th Cong. (1999); Violent 
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, S. 254, 106th 
Cong. (1999); The Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 1768, 106th Cong. 
(1999); S. 995, 106th Cong. (1999); The Firearm Heritage Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1032, 
106th Cong. (1999); New Millennium Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 899, 106th Cong. 
(1999); The Children Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1342, 106th Cong. (1999). 
160. There are no comparable bills in Congress relating to the use of inherently non­
dangerous weapons such as chairs or hammers. There are many laws regarding the use of 
motorized vehicles which are often the weapons that defendants use to commit aggravated 
assault with an inherently non-dangerous weapon, and for which these same defendants re­
ceive double counted sentences for "otherwise using" the vehicle. See, e.g. , United States v. 
Morris, 131 F.3d 1136 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992). These laws, however, are not aimed at 
the vehicles potentially used to commit intentional acts of violence such as aggravated as­
sault, rather they are laws aimed at curtailing the danger that comes from accidents and mis­
use. For some examples of bills currently being debated in Congress relating to automobiles, 
see Auto Safety Assurance Act of 1999, H.R. 3153, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Carrier Safety 
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and view crimes involving guns to be particularly harmful to society. 
For instance, Congress has spent much energy debating gun control 
bills. In less than a year, Congress has debated at least eight bills di­
rectly pertaining to gun control and safety.161 
Federal legislators, the Commission, and others have demonstrated 
that a goal of sentencing is proportionality. One way for courts to meet 
the goal of proportionality in sentencing is to refrain from double 
counting as applied in the context of defendants who commit aggra­
vated assault with inherently nondangerous weapons. 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced in Littleton, Colorado,162 gone are the days when 
kids merely throw fists or sticks and stones in the schoolyard. The law 
should punish less severely those who choose to stay away from inher­
ently dangerous weapons like guns and punish those who use guns to 
commit aggravated assaults. Legislators advocate a harsher punish­
ment for offenders who use violent weapons than those who throw 
sticks or stones, or even those who use baseball bats. Consequently, 
courts should sentence offenders who attack with chairs to shorter 
prison terms than offenders who attack with guns. 
The aggravated assault Guideline has a graduated structure on its 
face and metes out graduated sentences when applied to aggravated 
assaults with inherently dangerous weapons. When the base offense 
level is enhanced under any of the special offense characteristics in 
section 2A2.2(b )(2), the court does not double count a single factor. 
The graduated enhancement schedule, however, falls apart in struc­
ture and purpose when a defendant who commits an aggravated as­
sault with an inherently nondangerous weapon such as a chair is given 
an enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon. The en­
hancement double counts the defendant's use or threatened use of the 
weapon. 
Applied double counting is impermissible because the Commission 
did not intend its graduated enhancement schedule to fall apart upon 
application, therefore, the Commission did not intend the double 
counting as applied. Further, just because the Commission prohibited 
double counting elsewhere in the Guidelines does not lead to the con­
clusion that double counting in this instance is permissible. Finally, 
Act of 1999, H.R. 2679, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, 
S. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999). 
161. See supra note 159. 
162. On April 20, 1999, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, two students at Columbine High 
School in Littleton, Colorado opened fire on their classmates killing 12 students, one 
teacher, and themselves. Tom Kenworthy, Big Bomb Found in School, Police Think 2 Gun­
men May Have Been Helped, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at 3. 
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even if courts find that double counting is permissible they should re­
sist it. To resist it promotes the Commission's goals of uniformity and 
fairness. Further, due to the ambiguity created by applied double 
counting, courts should err on the side of lenity in sentencing. Finally, 
courts should resist double counting because Congress deems crimes 
involving inherently dangerous weapons such as guns more dangerous 
than crimes with chairs. If courts hold that attacking with a gun and at­
tacking with a chair garner the same punishment, they undermine 
Congress' goal of proportionality in sentencing and the public's sense 
of justice. 
Instead of engaging in applied double counting, courts faced with 
an offender who qualified for the aggravated assault provision of the 
Guidelines through the use of an inherently nondangerous weapon 
should refuse to apply the second enhancement "when a dangerous 
weapon was otherwise used." Instead, courts should sentence such of­
fenders only for the base offense level. 
